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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 318663

FOR CHARGE FROM AF/C - MCCULLEY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

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SECURITY IN THE EAST:  
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2. I ATTENDED A BRIEFING LAST WEDNESDAY GIVEN BY TWO DS  
OFFICERS WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM EASTERN ZAIRE. JOHN  
BEAUDRY AND RUSSEL ROSS PROVIDED A COGENT (IF NONE TOO  
SURPRISING) REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE  
Camps. AS CLAUDE RAINS SAID IN "CASABLANCA," I WAS  
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"SHOCKED" TO LEARN THAT REFUGEES LIVE IN DEPLORABLE  
CONDITIONS AND THE EXTREMISTS HAVE SEIZED CONTROL OF THE  
DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. ROSS AND BEAUDRY  
WERE LESS THAN IMPRESSED WITH THE UNHCR/NGO EVACUATION  
PLAN IN THE EVENT OF A REFUGEE UPRISING (OR AN UPSURGE IN  
INCIDENTS LIKE THE RECENT BLOW-UP IN KATALE), AND WANTED  
TO INTEGRATE THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY  
SITUATION WITH U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON EVACUATION OF  
AMERICANS/EXPATS.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT ENOUGH FOLK WERE ALREADY WORKING ON  
THE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS ISSUE, AND THAT WE SHOULD  
RATHER PROCEED WITH CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLANNING AS AN  
ADJUNCT TO KINSHASA'S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (COORDINATED

WITH KIGALI AND BUJ AS THE OBVIOUS UNCLASSIFIED POINTS). I NOTED THAT DALE WAS IN THE AREA ON AN AMCIT ASSESSMENT TRIP, AND THAT KINSHASA HAD ALREADY PUT IN A REQUEST FOR TDY CONSULAR SUPPORT. IF DS INSISTED ON AN EVAC PLAN FOR EASTERN ZAIRE, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO SEND A CONSULAR OFFICER AND A DS AGENT TDY TO ZAIRE FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS TO FOLLOW ON THE WORK DALE HAS ALREADY DONE, AND TO ASSIST THE EMBASSY IN UPDATING THIS SECTION OF THE EAC. MANY AROUND THE TABLE NOTED THAT WHATEVER WORK WAS DONE WOULD PERFORCE BE A SNAPSHOT OF THE AMCIT SITUATION IN THE EAST. AS DALE'S CABLE POINTED OUT, THE TRANSIENT EXPAT POPULATION IS VERY MOBILE, AND THE LONG-TERM RESIDENTS WOULD LIKELY WANT TO RIDE OUT WHATEVER STORM IS BREWING.

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RETRAINING THE FAZ: A MULTI-CREDIT COURSE  
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4. HANK COHEN CALLED MONDAY TO ADVISE THAT HIS ASSOCIATE, FORMER DASD JIM WOODS, PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO ZAIRE THIS WEEK TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FAZ HIGH COMMAND AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ON RETRAINING THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY. HANK SAID THAT DURING HIS OWN RECENT TRIP TO ZAIRE, HE HAD SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME WITH ELUKI, AND IT SEEMS THE FAZ OFFICER CORPS WANTS TRAINING ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY. HANK WANTED TO BE SURE THAT THE USG HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE TRIP, AND SAID THAT WOODS WOULD MAKE CERTAIN HIS ZAIRIAN INTERLOCUTORS UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE A PRIVATE/PRIVATE AMERICAN INITIATIVE. I BRIEFED A/S MOOSE ON THE PLAN, AND GEM SAID THAT "HANK AND JIM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED" IN THEIR EFFORTS. WOODS SHOULD ARRIVE IN KINSHASA O/A NOVEMBER 30, AND WILL CONTACT YOU TO BRIEF ON HIS DISCUSSIONS.

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ME. MUKENDI: THE REASONABLE FACE OF THE UDPS

5. MAITRE MUKENDI CHECKED IN A FEW DAYS AGO IN AF/C AT THE END OF HIS USIS IV PROGRAM. HE WAS QUITE PLEASED WITH HIS PROGRAM. MUKENDI WENT OVER MANY OF THE SAME POINTS FROM HIS OCTOBER MEETING WITH REED (REPORTED IN A FRONT CHANNEL), AND STRESSED THAT, DESPITE UDPS DIFFICULTIES WITH U.S. POLICY, THE PARTY FELT THE U.S. TO

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BE AN ALLY AND WISHED TO MAINTAIN A DIPLOMATIC FRIENDSHIP  
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SAID THAT HE WOULD ARGUE THE UDPS CASE ON THE LEGITIMACY  
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OF KENGO'S ELECTION BEFORE ZAIRE'S HIGH COURT SOON AFTER  
HIS RETURN, AND HE PRESSED FOR THE U.S. POSITION SHOULD  
THE COURT RULE AGAINST KENGO. I WAS NON-COMMITTAL.  
MUKENDI WAS RELAXED AND ENGAGING, AND I WAS RELIEVED THAT  
HE CHOSE NOT TO BRING ALONG THE CONFRONTATIONAL ZEALOTS  
FROM ZAIRE NETWORK. I UNDERSTAND FROM A COLLEAGUE ON THE  
ITALY DESK THAT THE UDPS HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH THE  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME. SUSPECT THAT THIS IS  
LAMBERT MENDE, ON THE SOUTHERN LEG OF HIS "TRUTH SQUAD"  
BOONDOGGLE. WHOEVER IT IS, THEY WILL LIKELY SEE A SECOND  
SECRETARY; I PROVIDED SOME BACKGROUND INFO ON THE U.S.  
PARTY LINE ON ZAIRE.

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SECURITY IN THE CAMPS: PART DEUX  
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6. THE FRIENDS OF RWANDA REPORTING CABLE IS WENDING ITS WAY UP TO THE SEVENTH FLOOR. U/S WIRTH WANTED A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE DAY'S EVENTS, BUT GIVEN THE REQUIRED CLEARANCES BY FIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES, IT HAS BEEN DELAYED A BIT. THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS SECTION OF THE MEETING. KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS WILL NOT SEE THE LIGHT OF DAY IN A FRONT CHANNEL, AND HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BEYOND THE DOOR OF MY OFFICE.

BEGIN TEXT:

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SUMMARY

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2. UNDERSECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS TIM WIRTH CHAIRED AN ALL-DAY SESSION ON NOVEMBER 22 OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP ("FRIENDS OF RWANDA") TO ADDRESS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES ATTENDANT TO THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA. IN ADDITION TO THE UNITED STATES, EIGHT COUNTRIES AND THE UN AND EUROPEAN UNION SENT HIGH-RANKING DELEGATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS. FRANCE

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DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE, BUT SENT OBSERVERS FROM THEIR EMBASSY. THE SESSION OPENED WITH A DISCUSSION OF PERHAPS THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE: SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE. THE CONFERENCE CONTINUED WITH SEGMENTS ON UN AND BILATERAL COORDINATION, PREPARATIONS FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY, ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AND EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN DECEMBER IN NEW YORK TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

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U.S. OPENING  
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3. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH UNDERLINED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEE THE "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MECHANISM AS A CONTACT GROUP NOR AS A POLITICAL PRESSURE GROUP. WIRTH SAID THAT POLITICAL DECISIONS ON RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA WOULD BE MADE ELSEWHERE, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THE FORMAL TITLE OF THE "FRIENDS," THE

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RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP (ROSG), WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY THAT THE BODY WOULD SUPPORT THE UN, THE OAU, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY TO THE REGION. WIRTH EMPHASIZED THAT THE COMPLEX SERIES OF PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION MUST BE HANDLED IN A COORDINATED FASHION. HE NOTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD PUT A "CONSTRUCTIVE PAPER" ON THE TABLE TO ADDRESS THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS, AND ASKED THE DELEGATIONS TO REVIEW AND COMMENT. WIRTH INVITED SHORT OPENING REMARKS BY THE DELEGATION HEADS, AND THEN ASKED UN UNDER SECRETARY FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS PETER HANSEN TO BRIEF THE CONFERENCE ON THE REPORT RELEASED LAST WEEK BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE.

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THREE DELEGATIONS RESPOND  
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4. THE FRENCH, WHO HAD REFUSED AN INVITATION TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE SESSION, WERE NONTHELESS REPRESENTED BY THEIR DCM AND AFRICA WATCHER FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE FRENCH OBSERVER NOTED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT FRANCE BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL

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COMMUNITY MUST ACT QUICKLY AND SHOULD COORDINATE  
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EFFORTS. NONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE REGION COULD BE  
RESOLVED INDEPENDENTLY; RATHER THE SITUATION ARGUED FOR A  
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND THE  
OAU. THE BELGIANS, REPRESENTED BY MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS FRANS VAN DAELE, AGREED ON THE NEED  
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, BUT ARGUED THAT A FIRST,  
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DOABLE STEP MIGHT BE TO FOCUS ON THE VOLUNTARY  
REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI. THE  
BELGIANS ALSO ASKED FOR THE ADDITION OF AN AGENDA ITEM ON  
ORGANIZATION OF FUTURE MEETINGS, THE VENUE AND  
PARTICIPANTS. THE HEAD OF THE TUNISIAN DELEGATION NOTED  
DRYLY THAT HE REPRESENTED THE ONLY AFRICAN COUNTRY AT THE  
TABLE. HE SAID THAT TUNISIA SUPPORTED THE LEADING ROLE  
OF THE UN IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE  
OAU WOULD PLAY A PART, "ACCORDING TO ITS MEANS." HE  
URGED THAT COUNTRIES FROM THE REGION PARTICIPATE IN  
FUTURE SESSIONS.

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SECURITY IN THE CAMPS - THE SYG'S REPORT  
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5. IN HIS PRESENTATION ON THE SYG'S REPORT ON THE  
SITUATION IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS, U/SYG HANSEN  
EMPHASIZED THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS.  
HE NOTED THAT IT WAS MEANINGLESS TO TALK ABOUT THE  
REFUGEE CAMPS WITHOUT FACTORING IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE  
INTERNAL DISPLACED; THAT IT MADE NO SENSE TO ADDRESS  
THE DISPLACED WITHOUT LOOKING AT CONDITIONS WITHIN  
RWANDA. HANSEN URGED THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL FOR THE  
"FRIENDS OF RWANDA" SHOULD BE THE AMELIORATION OF  
CONDITIONS WITHIN RWANDA IN ORDER TO CREATE AN  
APPROPRIATE CLIMATE TO ENCOURAGE THE VOLUNTARY  
REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES. THE SYG'S REPORT,  
ACCORDING TO HANSEN, OFFERED A RANGE OF OPTIONS FROM  
ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN POLICE TO THE DISPATCH OF A  
10,000 TO 12,000 MAN UN FORCE TO SEPARATE THE MILITIA AND  
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THE FORMER RWANDAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FROM THE MAIN  
BODY OF REFUGEES. HANSEN SAID THAT EXCISING THE  
EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WOULD FREE THE CIVILIAN REFUGEE  
POPULATION FROM THE "TOTALITARIAN REIGN OF TERROR." IN

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BETWEEN THESE EXTREME OPTIONS, THE UN CLASSIFIED  
CONTEMPLATED OTHER MEASURES, INCLUDING A SMALLER FORCE OF  
2,000 TO 4,000 TO PROVIDE MINIMUM SECURITY IN THE CAMPS  
AND OFFER A SAFE CORRIDOR FOR THOSE REFUGEES WHO WISHED  
TO RETURN.

6. GENERAL JOSEPH BARIL, MILITARY ADVISOR THE UN DPKO,  
CONTINUED WITH A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON THE SYG'S  
REPORT. BARIL SAID THAT THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY (EX-FAR)  
WAS A "BEATEN UP" FORCE, BUT THAT IT "WAS NOT TOO BEATEN  
UP," AND THAT IT MAINTAINED A FORCE LEVEL OF 20,000 MEN.  
BARIL SAID THAT EX-FAR WAS "DANGEROUS, STILL WELL-ARMED,  
WELL FED," AND WAS INCREASING ITS CAPABILITY ALL THE  
TIME. BARIL SAID THAT UNAMIR, WITH A FORCE OF 5,500  
COULD SURVIVE "IN THE HEART OF AFRICA," BUT COULD NOT BE  
EXPECTED TO TACKLE THE EX-FAR. BARIL SUGGESTED, HOWEVER,  
THAT UNAMIR "COULD ACT AS THE ANCHOR" FOR AN  
INTERNATIONAL FORCE WHICH MIGHT CROSS INTO ZAIRE NORTH  
AND SOUTH OF LAKE KIVU. BARIL OPINED THAT IT WOULD TAKE  
FIVE YEARS TO PUT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE OF 12,000 MEN INTO  
THE FIELD, "IN THE NORMAL UN WAY," AND THAT IN THE  
INTERIM, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE  
SOLUTION. BARIL SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE UN  
ASSESSMENT ON THE NEED FOR SOME TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL  
FORCE, AND THAT THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT  
OF THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE ASSISTANCE OF THE  
ZAIRIAN ARMY. THE FORCE MUST ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE  
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INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT, THE SAFE DELIVERY OF  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND THE SAFE PASSAGE OF REFUGEES  
WHO WISHED TO RETURN TO RWANDA. UNAMIR, HE SAID, COULD  
PROVIDE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, BUT  
THE NEW FORCE WOULD REQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT MANDATE.

7. CONTINUING, BARIL EXPLAINED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF  
THE OPERATION WOULD INVOLVE A "SPEARHEAD" OF TWO  
HIGHLY-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED UNITS TO GO IN AND  
ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE EX-FAR CAMPS AROUND GOMA AND  
BUKAVU. THE FORCE WOULD HAVE ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
TO PERMIT IT TO ENFORCE SECURITY, AND THEN WOULD BEGIN TO  
IDENTIFY ACCEPTABLE FORMER RWANDAN MILITARY TO TRAIN AND  
ASSIST WITH ROUTINE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THE UN FORCE  
WOULD THEN "LEAPFROG" INTO THE CIVILIAN CAMPS. BARIL  
ESTIMATED THAT SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD TAKE AT LEAST TWO  
YEARS WITH SUCH A LIMITED FORCE. HE UNDERLINED THAT THE  
RWANDAN CRISIS WOULD NOT BE SETTLED BY A MILITARY  
SOLUTION; THE UN FORCE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A POLITICAL

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STRATEGY.

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"REVANCHISM" AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

8. U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION PHYLLIS OAKLEY NOTED THAT A TWO YEAR TIMEFRAME PRESENTED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS. WITH A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, MANY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FEARED REVANCHIST ATTACKS BY HUTU EXTREMISTS WHICH COULD SPARK RENEWED WARFARE IN

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RWANDA. OAKLEY SAID THAT IF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION WOULD NEED TWO YEARS TO RE-ESTABLISH ORDER IN THE CAMPS, REVANCHISM MIGHT OVERTAKE THIS EFFORT AND VITIATE ANY POSITIVE EFFECTS. BARIL REPLIED THAT THE UN FORCE WOULD BE A "DETERRENT" AND A "STABILIZER" BUT THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) WOULD SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF AMNESTY FOR THE EXTREMISTS. CLEARLY, HE ADMITTED, THE GOR WAS FAR FROM READY TO ENTERTAIN SUCH A DISCUSSION. OAKLEY RETURNED TO THE LENGTHY TIMEFRAME OF THE OPERATION, AND URGED THE UN TO "JUMP START" THE PROCESS. BARIL RESPONDED THAT A JUMP START WAS POSSIBLE ONLY UNDER CHAPTER VII, AND THEN ONLY IF A MEMBER STATE OR GROUP OF MEMBER STATES TOOK THE LEAD IN DEPLOYING THE FORCE.

9. THE FRENCH OBSERVER WELCOMED THE SYG'S REPORT, BUT ASKED WHETHER THE UN HAD YET MADE APPROACHES TO POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT OTHER UN OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT WERE BEGINNING TO STAND DOWN (IN MOZAMBIQUE, FOR EXAMPLE), AND SUGGESTED THE UN CONSIDER DISCUSSIONS TO ASK COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS ALREADY IN PLACE TO TRANSFER THEM TO CENTRAL AFRICA. U/SYG HANSEN SAID THAT INITIAL APPROACHES HAD BEEN MADE, PARTICULARLY ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO A UN POLICE FORCE IN ZAIRE, BUT THERE WAS "NO ENTHUSIASM SHOWN." HANSEN ADMITTED THAT PROSPECTS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING, AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF UNAMIR II WERE INSTRUCTIVE. UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT OF A FIRST PHASE WITH TWO WELL-EQUIPPED BATTALIONS, BUT ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS A REALISTIC OPTION IF NO COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO COMMIT TROOPS. IN

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RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUERY FROM WIRTH, U/SYG HANSEN SAID  
THE FIRST OPTION THE UN SHOULD PURSUE MIGHT BE TO  
STRENGTHEN THE ZAIRIAN POLICE.

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THE BELGIANS LOBBY  
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10. RETURNING TO THEMES ENUNCIATED IN THEIR "COMPREHENSIVE" PLAN FOR THE REGION, THE BELGIANS ARGUED THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MUST BE ACCCOMPANIED BY A COORDINATED APPROACH COMBINING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND A REPATRIATION STRATEGY. INCREASING SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS RISKED "FIXING REFUGEES WHERE THEY ARE," AND DID NOT DEAL WITH THE EQUALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF HOW TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO RETURN TO RWANDA. FRANS VAN DAELE, THE BELGIAN DELEGATION HEAD, SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT A CHAPTER VII OPERATION COULD PASS MUSTER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WAS EQUALLY PESSIMISTIC THAT COUNTRIES WOULD COME FORWARD TO CONTRIBUTE WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS FOR A CHAPTER VI PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. VAN DAELE SUGGESTED THAT THE UN SHOULD CONSIDER AFRICAN TROOPS, SUPPORTED, EQUIPPED AND AIR-LIFTED TO THE REGION BY THE WEST. THE BELGIANS REMAINED CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MOVE BEYOND THE PEACEKEEPING PROBLEM TO CONSIDER WAYS TO RE-START A DIALOG BETWEEN THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED IN THE RWANDAN CONFLICT, AND THAT WE SUPPORT MILITARY REINTEGRATION AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (PERHAPS USING UGANDA AS A MODEL).

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11. LATER, BELGIAN MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR GENERAL VAN DAELE ADDED THAT BRUSSELS HAD INVESTED HEAVILY IN POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN BURUNDI, AND THAT THE PROCESS REMAINED FRAGILE. HE ADMITTED THAT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM, WITH THE ATTENDANT RISK OF A RENEWED CIVIL WAR. NONETHELESS, BELGIUM WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON ZAIRE WOULD PERMIT THE RELATED PROBLEM OF RWANDAN REFUGEES IN BURUNDI TO "FESTER," POSING GREAT RISK TO THE TENUOUS POLITICAL PACT IN BUJUMBURA.

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CANADA AND TUNISIA ON REFUGEE RETURN  
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11. THE CANADIANS AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE NO LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WITHOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA. CANADA WAS CONCERNED THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM COULD CONTINUE "FOR YEARS," AND THAT MORE EFFORT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO COPING WITH THE EXTERNAL CRISIS THAN ADDRESSING THE SITUATION INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE CANADIANS EMPHASIZED THAT ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WAS CRUCIAL, AND URGED THAT "WE MUST BE CLEAR ON OUR OBJECTIVES." THE TUNISIANS DESCRIBED THE REFUGEES AS "BETWEEN A HAMMER AND A CLUB," AND VOICED CONCERN THAT THE GOR HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH TO FACILITATE REPATRIATION. THE TUNISIANS SAID THE OAU AGREED ON A TWO TRACK EFFORT: ACTION WITHIN RWANDA TO CREATE CONDITIONS TO ENCOURAGE THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, AND ACTION TO DEAL WITH SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THEY STRESSED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE MUST

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BE IMPLICATED IN ANY INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN EASTERN ZAIRE, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ZAIRIANS MIGHT BE ABLE TO DISARM THE EX-FAR (COMMENT: NOT LIKELY. END COMMENT). THE TUNISIAN DELEGATION AGREED THAT EXPANSION OF UNAMIR POSED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS: WHILE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE READY FOR "POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT" IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN CENTRAL AFRICA, THE DELAYS IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE AFRICAN BATTALIONS FOR UNAMIR II MIGHT MILITATE AGAINST A SIMILAR APPROACH FOR ZAIRE. BEYOND THIS, THE TUNISIANS WORRIED THAT UNAMIR INVOLVEMENT BEYOND RWANDA'S BORDERS, PARTICULARLY IN THE VOLATILE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, MIGHT DAMAGE THE OPERATION'S CREDIBILITY INSIDE RWANDA.

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GERMANY: "WHAT ARE OUR INTERESTS?"  
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12. THE GERMANS, WHO HAD REMAINED SILENT DURING THE INITIAL DISCUSSIONS, OFFERED THEIR PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE. AMBASSADOR HARALD GANNS, THE GERMAN MFA DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, ASKED THE SESSION TO EXAMINE "WHAT ARE OUR INTERESTS" IN EASTERN ZAIRE? GANNS SUGGESTED THAT, FOR GERMANY, THE SECURITY OF ITS NATIONALS WORKING IN THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE REFUGEES WILL BE ENCAMPED IN ZAIRE FOR SOME TIME, AND SHOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. GANNS SAID THAT EVEN A SMALL FORCE TO ACCOMPANY AID WORKERS INTO THE CAMPS TO ASSURE

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DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WOULD FULLY ASSURE UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENCE OF THE NGOS. THE GERMANS AGREED THAT THE  
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SECURITY ISSUE MUST BE LINKED TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION  
AND REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, BUT THAT WHILE THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WISHED TO ACT, IT SEEMED  
SKEPTICAL OF ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. GANNS WARNED  
THAT IF A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ENTERED THE CAMPS, THE  
ENTIRE POPULATION WOULD RESIST, AND THERE COULD BE A  
BLOODY WAR. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS  
UNDERSTANDABLE THAT NO COUNTRIES WISHED TO COMMIT TROOPS.

13. GANNS CONTINUED THAT, UNSAVORY AS IT MAY SEEM,  
GERMANY AGREED WITH THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THERE  
MUST BE A DIALOG BETWEEN THE GOR AND THE LEADERS IN  
EXILE. IT WAS CERTAIN THAT KAGAME WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS  
SUGGESTION, AND GERMANY BELIEVED THAT THERE MUST BE AN  
END TO "THIS CULTURE OF IMPUNITY." THAT SAID, IF THE  
ALTERNATIVE WAS A BLOODY WAR BETWEEN AN INTERNATIONAL  
PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND THE REFUGEES, A DIALOG MIGHT BE  
ONE OF THE LEAST OBJECTIONABLE OPTIONS. AT THE SAME  
TIME, THE GERMANS SUPPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
MINIMUM OF SECURITY FOR THE NGOS WORKING IN THE CAMPS,  
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION, AND THE  
NEED TO CREATE CONDITIONS WITHIN RWANDA WHICH WOULD  
ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO RETURN.

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SWEDEN AND JAPAN RESPOND  
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14. THE SWEDISH DELEGATION GENTLY SUGGESTED THAT "OUR  
INTERESTS" IN THE REGION LIE IN HELPING TO REPAIR THE  
DAMAGE TO AFRICA BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN RWANDA.

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AMBASSADOR ANDERS OLJELUND, MFA DEPUTY POLITICAL  
DIRECTOR, WARNED THAT DONOR FATIGUE WAS DANGEROUS FOR  
AFRICA, AND THAT THE INSECURITY WHICH REIGNED IN THE  
CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO MOVE INTO  
RWANDA. OLJELUND SAID THAT BEST WAY TO DEMONSTRATE TO  
OUR OWN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE MOVING TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS  
WAS TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND  
REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES. OLJELUND ADDED THAT THE  
GOR MUST BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE LARGE NUMBERS OF

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RETURNEES, AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES UNCLASSIFIED MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE PROCESS.

15. SHUNJI MARUYAMA, JAPAN'S DEPUTY PERMREP AT THE UN, NOTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN WITH THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, BUT SAID THAT JAPAN WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROPOSE A PREFERRED OPTION. MARUYAMA SAID THAT THERE WERE ONGOING TALKS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS ISSUE, AND IT APPEARED THAT THE "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" FORUM DUPLICATED THESE DISCUSSIONS.

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WIRTH ON PRIVATE CONTRACTORS  
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16. AT THIS POINT, UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH NOTED U.S. INTEREST IN PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY PROBLEM WITH PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, NOTING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE SYG'S REPORT. U/SYG HANSEN REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT A "PREFERRED OPTION," BUT THAT "TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION" OF THE PROPOSAL WAS UNDERWAY. WIRTH PRESSED HANSEN FOR AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST,

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LOGISTICS, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF WHO MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, BUT THE UN REPRESENTATIVES COULD PROVIDE NO DETAILS. MAJOR GENERAL BARIL ADMITTED THAT A UN TEAM WAS NOW IN GOMA TO ASSESS THIS OPTION, BUT THAT THE REPORT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE SYG BEFORE SHARING WITH MEMBER STATES. BARIL SHARED HANSEN'S VIEW ON THE VIABILITY OF THIS OPTION, AND ADDED THAT "THE UN HAS NEVER DONE THIS BEFORE," AND TERMED IT A "FALL-BACK POSITION."

17. WIRTH REITERATED U.S. INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY OPTION, AND NOTED THAT THE PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE SYG'S REPORT SEEMED "DIFFICULT TO UNREALISTIC." WIRTH ADDED THAT HE WAS ALSO INTRIGUED BY THE BELGIAN APPROACH TO BEGIN IN BURUNDI, NOTING THAT "SUCCESS BREEDS SUCCESS."

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ROLE OF UNAMIR  
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18. THE UN DELEGATION REPORTED THAT WITHIN TWO TO THREE WEEKS, UNAMIR WILL AT LAST BE FULLY DEPLOYED TO ITS AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. BARIL SAID THAT HE EXPECTED A RESOLUTION NEXT WEEK TO EXTEND UNAMIR'S MANDATE. THE

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BELGIANS SUGGESTED THAT UNAMIR SHOULD ~~CONTINUE~~ ~~BE~~ ~~IN~~ ~~PLACE~~,  
BUT THAT THE MANDATE SHOULD PERMIT THE FORCE TO  
CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF  
REFUGEES. FURTHER, THE BELGIANS URGED THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL TO REVIEW THE MANDATE WITH AN ACCENT ON IMPROVING  
SECURITY IN THE VILLAGES AND RURAL AREAS. AS PART OF THE  
BELGIAN STRATEGY TO START WITH BURUNDI, BRUSSELS WOULD  
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ALSO LIKE UNAMIR AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS TO DEPLOY  
IN THE SOUTH TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN  
REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI.

HANSEN SUMS UP

19. PETER HANSEN SAID THAT WHILE THE FOCUS HAD BEEN ON  
THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES, THE SITUATION WITHIN RWANDA  
WAS CRITICAL. THE GOR WAS FRUSTRATED THAT THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD RESPONDED TO THE EXTERNAL  
CRISIS TO THE DETRIMENT OF RWANDA. HANSEN NOTED THAT 80  
PERCENT OF INTERNATIONAL AID HAD GONE OUTSIDE RWANDA,  
WHILE ONLY 20 PERCENT HAD BEEN SPENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY.  
HE ADDED THAT INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN RWANDA  
WERE ALMOST AS NUMEROUS AS THE REFUGEES. HANSEN WAS  
COGNIZANT OF THE "MORAL ANGUISH" FELT BY THE NGOS IN  
PROVIDING RELIEF TO PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN  
GENOCIDE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE RWANDAN  
REFUGEES WERE CIVILIANS (MAINLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN).  
HANSEN CONCLUDED THAT WE DO NOT WANT "ALL OR NOTHING  
SOLUTIONS."

END TEXT.

7. REGARDS.

CHRISTOPHER

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